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 Abstract  
This paper explores how the initial farm size structure affects the exit decision of farms 
inducing free land capacities, and the allocation of the newly available land resources to the 
remaining farms in a particular region. We model an agricultural market where large and 
small firms first decide whether to leave the market or not; in case of continuing in production 
the farms compete for getting access to additional land resources in a Vickrey auction. We 
find that larger farms allocate more additional quantity than small farms; the latter are more 
likely to leave the market. An empirical illustration gives further support and reveals the 
relation between farm size structure, farm exits and growth of the large.  
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 1 INTRODUCTION  
Structural change in the agricultural sector has been a subject of ongoing interest (cf. among 
others Boehlje, 1999 or Goodard et al., 1993). Since basic food production being replaced by 
complex (bio-)technological production systems it is not surprising that the structure of 
primary production has altered: the number of farms has declined, whereas their average size 
has increased. This evolution results from farms’ individual adaptation processes like growth 
and exit to changing prices, policy changes or technical progress (cf. among others Kimhi and 
Bollman, 1999 or Pietola et al., 2003). However, empirical evidence points to substantial 
differences in the regional farm size structure. In some regions farms are equally sized in 
terms of land endowment, while in other regions land is rather unequally distributed among 
the farms.
1 A frequently observed phenomenon thereby is the persistence of farms in a size 
category (Balmann, 1997; Boehlje, 1992). Consequently, regionally differing structures 
remain and allow for regionally different patterns of structural change (Harrington and 
Reinsel, 1995; Goetz and Debertin, 2001). For instance, Breustedt and Glauben (2007) 
identify higher exit rates for regions in Western Europe that are characterized by a high share 
of small and part-time farms. However, the regional specifity of structural change remains a 
puzzle for agricultural economists (Schmitt, 1992). The crucial question thereby is how do 
such regional asymmetries in the farm size structure measured in terms of land endowment 
arise and how can these be used to explain regionally differing patterns of structural change. 
Most of the literature on structural change analyses either farm growth or exit.
2 However, it is 
common wisdom that a farm cannot grow unless other farms shrink or exit resulting in newly 
available land resources (e.g. Balmann et al., 2006). The immobility and shortage of this 
production factor causes a strong interdependence of farms within a region and affects farms’ 
individual decision making like growth, decline or exit (Chavas, 2001). The interdependence 
of growth and exits is considered in Weiss (1999) as well as in Markov chain approaches (e.g. 
Zepeda, 1995 or Tonini and Jongeneel, 2007). Leathers (1992) directly considers the 
interaction in the land market. With his model he attempts to assess impacts of different farm 
programmes on the number of farms leaving the market, the land prices and the output prices. 
Land supply is assumed to be fixed and the free land from the exiting farms is traded among 
                                                 
1 For instance, in the Western part of Germany there exist regions with a stable share of medium farms on the 
one hand, while on the other hand the phenomenon of a disappearing middle class has been detected (see also 
Weiss (1999) for empirical evidence of the disappearing middle class in Austria.). It has been further found that 
this phenomenon especially occurs in regions where land is initially distributed rather unequal among the farms 
(Margarian, 2007).  
2 Empirical studies about farm growth are often motivated by Gibrat’s law (the size of a firm and its growth rate 
are independent) ignoring economic theory (e.g. Shapiro et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1992; Kostov et al., 2006; 
Bakusc and Fertö, 2007). 
 1 farmers. The farms differ in their initial endowment and their managerial ability determining 
the land market behaviour. He finds a direct effect of some farm programmes on the number 
of farms. For instance may price support or demand enhancement programmes cause an 
increase in land prices. Even though these may also lead to an increase in commodity prices 
the net effect may reduce the number of farms. In turn, Vranken and Swinnen (2006) focus on 
the development of land markets during the transition period. Analysing the competition of 
household owned farms with large-scaled corporate farms in Hungary, they find that the 
dominance of large corporate farms in some regions leads to a constraint access to land for 
(smaller) household farms. Huettel and Margarian (2009) show that strategic interaction – 
measured by market power of large farms, the potential of high competition for land within a 
region and possibly high rents of the status quo – is a crucial determinant of regionally 
differing patterns of structural change. Their findings give further evidence that initial 
(historic) conditions, such as the number and size of farms, lead to differing local equilibria in 
the land market characterized by differences in market power relations. As further emphasised 
by Kellermann et al. (2008), strategic interaction in the land market plays a crucial role for 
structural change in agriculture.  
Combining theoretical and empirical approaches, we aim at determining how the initial farm 
structure affects both the exit decision of farms inducing free land capacities as well as the 
allocation of the newly available land resources to the remaining farms in a particular region. 
We consider an agricultural market with a finite number of firms that produce a homogenous 
good that they sell at a given price in final or intermediate goods markets. Firms can be either 
large or small, whereas the small firms are supposed to have lower returns to scale than large 
firms. This mirrors the higher ability of large firms to undertake investments in more efficient 
production techniques. We develop a simple three-stage game where first the firms decide 
whether to exit or to continue agricultural production. Given the exit decision of some firms, 
land resources become available that are distributed among the remaining firms in the market. 
The land market is modelled as a Vickrey auction, where a single auctioneer sells the 
available land resources on behalf of the exiting farmers. The auctioneer acts as an 
intermediary without any strategic incentives. The Vickrey mechanism ensures an efficient 
allocation implying that the bidder with the highest valuation wins. In turn, the auctioneer 
pays the selling firms an average price weighted by their capacity sold. It turns out that larger 
firms have an higher incentive to grow than smaller firms. Furthermore, small firms are more 
likely to leave the market than large firms.  
 2 In a further step, we empirically illustrate our findings. This part of the paper is closely related 
to Huettel and Margarian (2009); however, we reinterpret their findings in the light of the 
theoretical results. Additionally, to further explore exit and farm growth in more detail, we 
estimate two general linear models. We find that regional asymmetries in firm size measured 
by the concentration of land endowment is positively related to exit rates (mainly small farms) 
and negatively to the growth rate of the medium farms. It can further be shown that, 
depending on the farm size structure, a large pool of available resources or a strong 
competition with a low pool of free land further deepen the differentiation of farms in their 
size.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an extended literature review to 
provide the theoretical background of the analysis of structural change in different regions. A 
simple model of farm exit, land allocation and downstream competition is shown in Section 3. 
In Section 4 we empirically illustrate the findings to underline our results. Finally, we 
conclude in Section 5. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The theory of industry dynamics takes a prominent place in the economics of industrial 
organisation. For a long time, research in industrial organisation has been based on the 
structure-conduct-performance-paradigm. This approach assumes a one-dimensional causality 
between the market structure, the behaviour of firms in the market and the efficiency of the 
firms. That is, a more concentrated market structure facilitates coordinated behaviour of firms 
and, thus, increases the firms’ performance in terms of profits. Taking the respective market 
structure as given, this approach is not satisfactory as markets are generally open and, 
therefore, allow for entry and exit. We further observe profound differences in the firms’ 
market shares and in the firm size (cf. Sutton, 1991). That is, the size distribution of firms is 
highly skewed in most industries (Sutton, 2007). Accordingly, Dunne et al. (2009) state 
“…While the effect of market structure, the number and relative size of producers, on firm 
and industry pricing, mark-ups, and profits is generally the focus of interest, it has long been 
recognized that market structure cannot be viewed as exogenous to the competitive process. 
Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decision of individual producers and 
theses are affected by expectations of future profits which, in turn, depend on the nature of 
competition within the market”. Thus, what are the driving forces of the industry dynamics?  
 3 Industry dynamics are mainly characterized by the simultaneous
3 entry and exit of firms as 
well as growth and shrinkage. While entry
4 plays a minor role in agricultural markets, there is 
a strong debate about the firms’ incentives to leave the market.
5 Exit decisions are 
characterized by their (partial) irreversibility, the uncertainty of future expectations about the 
profitability and the investment’s flexible timing. Thus, it is not surprising, that exit decisions 
have been analysed using real options’ theory as for instance in Dixit (1989), Alvarez (1998, 
1999) and Murto (2004). The main idea is that the exit decisions have to be taken under 
uncertain price expectations and the possibility to delay the irreversible disinvestment 
decision gives it the character of a put option. Dixit (1989) shows that trigger prices for exit 
are less than variable cost minus the interest on the exit cost.
6 Murto (2004) explores this idea 
further and considers exit in a duopoly model (perfect Nash equilibrium framework) with 
uncertain revenues where the firms negatively affect each other’s profitability. He finds that 
there exists only a unique equilibrium if the uncertainty is sufficiently low or the asymmetry 
between the two firms is sufficiently high. This allows one firm to commit successfully to 
stay longer in the market in case the other firm leaves. As a consequence, one firm is forced to 
leave the market first. Under high uncertainty and if the firms are nearly about the same size, 
the reverse order may happen but no unique equilibrium will result. 
Other studies consider the impact of uncertainty in strategic games with the aim to explore 
industry dynamics based on competitive equilibrium theory (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982, Ericson 
and Pakes, 1989, Hopenhayn, 1992, or Hanazono and Yang, 2009). Ericson and Pakes (1989) 
take into account that the firms’ production is affected by investments with uncertain 
outcomes. Hopenhayn (1992) models a stationary equilibrium with idiosyncratic uncertainty 
to investigate high turnover rates within industries. The dynamic stochastic model for a 
competitive industry allows for endogenous entry and exit induced by exogenous shocks. This 
enables the reallocation of resources between the firms. Thus, the entry and exit rules imply 
the evolution of the state of the industry. He also finds that the size distribution is 
                                                 
3 Dunne et al. (1988) analyse the U.S. manufacturing industry over the period 1962-1982 and find notable and 
persistent differences in the entry and exit rates across industries. They also find a high correlation between entry 
and exit rates and conclude that there must be industry specific factors that determine these patterns of entry and 
exit.  
4 Note that there is large literature on market entry. For a comprehensive overview see Tirole (1988). 
5 Besides the literature that uses entry and exit as the main driver of industry dynamics there is also a large 
literature that focuses on technology innovation or improvement as the driving force behind industry dynamics. 
To this strand of literature belong Klepper and Graddy (1990), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Klepper 
(1996) as well as Klepper and Simons (2000).  
6 Isik et al. (2003) take up this approach and directly analyse the exit and capacity choice for agricultural 
enterprises in remote sensing technologies. They find a greater distance between the entry and exit trigger than 
under disregard of uncertainty and irreversibility of the choice. However, the market structure is not directly 
considered.  
 4 stochastically increasing with age, meaning that larger firms have a higher survival 
probability. Furthermore, based on firms’ learning about their relative uncertain cost 
positions, Hanazono and Yang (2009) explain that during shakeouts firms that entered just 
before the shakeout are more likely to exit than earlier entrants. They consider a dynamic 
game with an infinite time horizon where the firms decide in each period whether to enter or 
not. Their equilibrium findings confirm the empirical observations: the firms leaving the 
market first are those that entered the market later. 
Besides the models considering uncertainty or shocks, there is also a large literature where 
industry dynamics are analyzed deterministically by means of competition in declining 
industries (mainly earlier studies), e.g. Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985, 1990), Londreagan 
(1990), Reynolds (1988) and Whinston (1988). These studies explore firms’ exit or their 
reduction in capacity in declining markets. As Liebermann (1990) notes, all their models 
differ slightly in their respective assumptions and results but emphasize the strategic liability 
of the large firm size. 
Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) show that larger firms tend to exit first from a declining 
industry. This is due to the fact that big firms lose their viability more quickly compared to 
smaller firms. However, the order of exit may be reversed in the presence of economies of 
scale from which the larger firms benefit. In a later analysis, Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) 
allow for greater strategic flexibility and capacity adjustment. That is, they relax the 
assumption of discrete production, i.e. production to be all or nothing. If capacity adjustment 
is possible, they show that large firms reduce capacity first until they have reached the size of 
the small. Thus, survivability is inversely related to size. Whinston (1988) extends the work of 
Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985). Considering lumpy exits and allowing for partial reduction 
of capacity in a multi-plant setting, he shows that if the firms have the same number of plants, 
those with higher cost leave the market first. A lager firm with more operating plants closes 
its plants earlier than the smaller firms as long as the cost difference is not large. Further, 
Londregan (1990) shows by means of a duopoly that during growth periods high reentry costs 
can act like high exit costs and improve the strategic position of the larger firm. During the 
decline phase, the smaller firm has the better position.
7 
                                                 
7 Frank (1988) as well as Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) model exit decisions in a more general context. The latter 
relate exit in a duopoly with incomplete about the rivals’ costs. They show that in case of symmetric 
expectations and if exit occurs, the less efficient firm leaves the market first. 
 
 5 Asymmetric industry structures may also be induced or strengthened by initial differences in 
economic fundamentals or strategic positions. That is, asymmetries in firm size may result 
from a capacity accumulation game played by ex-ante identical firms that differ for instance 
in the cost structure, in their strategic positions or managerial ability (cf. Saloner, 1987, 
Leathers, 1992, Maggi, 1996, or Reynolds and Wilson, 2000). For instance, in a capacity 
constrained price game with sequential moves, temporal asymmetry allows the first mover 
(Stackelberg leader) to limit the follower’s capacity level (cf. Tirole, 1988: 228). As a 
consequence, the asymmetric structure remains and the profitability of the Stackelberg 
follower is reduced. Considering a duopoly with two initially differently sized firms that 
compete in prices under capacity constraints, Ghemawat (1990) shows that the initially larger 
firms take up all investment opportunities over time. This is due to the fact that the overall 
duopoly profits are maximised at the most asymmetric allocation of capacities for certain 
capacity levels. In turn, Krishna (1999) shows that the snowball effect proposed by Ghemawat 
(1990) does not necessarily hold. She considers a game where multiple units of capacity are 
sold sequentially to two ex-ante symmetric buyers and takes the buyers’ endogenous 
valuation of additional capacities into account. That is, the value of capacity is determined by 
the outcome of the subsequent market stage. It turns out that the convexity of payoffs in the 
market stage ensures a monopolization of capacity, while increasing returns to scale are not 
sufficient. In the case of concave payoffs, a monopolization cannot be an equilibrium. Note, 
that this does not necessarily induce that land capacities are equally shared (Krishna, 1999). 
However, as emphasized by Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) most of the literature does not 
show  “…whether substantial and persistent size differences can arise endogenously in 
equilibrium in a market in which ex ante identical firms interact repeatedly and are subject to 
firm-specific shocks that continuously alter their positions.” They use a dynamic model of 
capacity accumulation with product market competition where the firms are ex-ante identical 
in their size, in their cost structure and strategic position and show how asymmetries may 
arise endogenously. They further find that the mode of competition and the reversibility of 
investments are major determinants of the firm size distribution. The stronger the competition 
(e.g., price competition) and the higher the depreciation rate (investments are more reversible) 
is, the more tends the firm size structure towards stronger asymmetries (e.g., one large and 
one small firm).  
A very appealing approach to analyse endogenous market structures has been taken by Esö et 
al. (2007). They consider a framework with ex-ante identical firms that compete for scarce 
resources in an upstream market and subsequently for sales in the downstream market. Firms 
 6 are assumed to have symmetric production technologies and cost structures. The game 
involves two stages, in the first stage the capacities are allocated among the firms. The 
allocation is presumed to be efficient such that the each unit of capacity ends up with the firm 
that values it most. Given the respective capacity allocation resulting from the first stage, 
these firms compete in a second stage à la Cournot in the downstream market. The major 
finding is that an asymmetric industry structure becomes more likely the larger the pool of 
resources. However, a direct application of these models to the agricultural land market is not 
possible. As it is common wisdom, land is not a freely traded source that can be bought in an 
upstream market; in Western countries free land is only available if at least one farm leaves 
the market. Thus, firms can only grow if free capacities are available and so the exit-stage is 
crucial for any further industry development.  
3 EXIT AND ALLOCATION OF CAPACITY: A THEORETICAL APPROACH 
As already mentioned, structural change in the agricultural sector depends on the availability 
of land resources. However, land capacities become only available if farms exit agricultural 
production or reduce their farming activity. A farmer quits production if the respective 
opportunity costs are not covered anymore. That is, the exit decision depends on the previous 
production, on expectations about future prices and the market environment. In turn, a farm 
decides to opt for additional land if the respective costs are compensated by future revenues. 
The value of additional land resources thereby depends on the regional market environment. 
Hence, structural change in agriculture is determined by the farms’ decision either to exit the 
market or to extend their land endowment. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
We consider an agricultural market with n firms  1,..., in = . Each firm i produces a quantity   
of a homogenous good to be sold in a final or intermediate goods markets of perfect 
competition. As commonly observed in agricultural production, firms are price takers that sell 
their production at a given price 
i q
p . We distinguish two types of firms indicated by  ,s kl =  
where   denotes the ‘large’ firms and  1,..., l = m n 1, sm ..., = +  denotes the ‘small’ firms. Both 
types differ in their initial capacity  , whereas the initial capacity of the large firms is 
assumed to be higher than the initial capacity of the small firms, i.e.  . Correspondingly, 









ls s m = + 1 k ∑ ∑ . Firms’ 
production costs are based on scale effects and capacity constraints. Taking into account the 
 7 firms’ ex-ante choice of production technique, larger firms benefit from higher returns to 
scale than smaller firms. Thus, we consider the following cost functions 
     ()
2 () 1 / 2 ii k i i cq q q α =− ⋅+ 1,..., in ∀ = , 
where  k α  denotes a differentiation parameter with  ls α α >  and  , [0,1] ls α α ∈  such that we get  
   and ∀= .   () () ll ss cq q c > 1,..., lm ∀= 1,..., sm n +
Firms decide whether to leave the market or to continue production. We denote the respective 
number of firms leaving the market by e  where 1 k l em ≤ ≤  and 1 s en m ≤ ≤−, respectively. If 
firms decide to quit they sell their initially given capacity k  to the remaining firms in the 
market. We thereby neglect potential entrants as they only play a minor role in western 
agricultural markets. When deciding about exit, the firms balance the expected profits they 
earn in case of continuing production – possibly under extended capacity – and their profits in 
case of selling their initial capacity to the other firms in the market and likewise benefiting 
from the value of an outside option 
i
ψ .  
Thus, if firms quit production and decide to sell their initial capacity, a land market emerges. 
We model the land market as a Vickery auction. For simplicity, we assume that the firms 
leaving the market sell their initial capacity to an auctioneer who brings the sellers and buyers 
together at zero costs. We neglect any strategic incentives of the auctioneer and presume zero-
profits for the auctioneer. In other words, the auctioneer acts as a single seller of the newly 
available land resources. The bidding behaviour of the potential buyers is analyzed assuming 
independent private values. Thereby, we presume that the total amount of newly available 
land resources is a perfectly divisible good. Thus, the  l ne e s − −  potential buyers bid for a 
share of the overall available land capacity, i.e.  . The total production capacity of each 
remaining firm refers then to   with  . 
i k %
i kk + %
i 0 i k ≥ %
In a Vickery auction, a bidder winning k  units pays the   highest losing bids of the 
competing bidders. That is, each bidder has to pay an amount equal to the externality exerted 
on the competing bidders. Thus, a bidder cannot influence his own payment by bidding 
strategically. This implies that the bidders never intend to bid below or above their true 
valuation such that each bidder has the weakly dominant strategy to bid truthfully. In this 
case, each buyer bids exactly the revenue resulting from additional resources. We further 
assume that the auctioneer pays the leaving firms an average price for their capacities based 
k
 8 on the total payments made in the auction. Each firm pays  i ω  for the additional capacity  . 







  () () ,, ( ) ii i i i i i qk k p cq q i π ω +⋅ =− ⋅− %   with ii qkk i ≤ + %  (1) 
if they continue production, while they earn  









∑ , (2) 
if they leave the market. Note that the average price ω  the auctioneer pays to the exiting 
firms refers to the sum of overall payments made by the successful bidders divided by the 
sum of capacities that become available from firms’ exit.  
To summarise, we consider the following three-stage game: First, firms decide whether to 
leave the market or to stay. Then, the capacity of the leaving firms is distributed by an 
auctioneer to the remaining firms in the market. Finally, the firms decide about the quantities 
they produce and profits realize.  
3.2 Solving the Game  
To analyse the equilibrium strategies of the firms, we solve the game by backward induction.  
Downstream Competition. In the last stage of the game, each firm i decides about the 
quantity of production q . Firms sell their production at a price p. This assumption reflects 
that farmers often act as price takers in intermediate or final goods markets. Maximising (1) 

















If the capacity constraint is binding the firms’ production is restricted to the total capacity of a 
firm. Correspondingly, the reduced profit functions are given by 
  ( )
** * * (, , ) () iii i i i i qk k pcq q π + ⋅= − ⋅ % . (4) 
 
Land Market Auction. Given the exits of e l e s +  firms in the first stage of the game, an 
auctioneer sells the available land resources to the remaining ne l e s − − firms in the market in 
the second stage of the game. The remaining firms submit their separate sealed bids for a 
share of the total available land capacity sold by the auctioneer. Each bidder has an individual 
 9 valuation for an additional unit of land resource being equal to the payoff of the additional 
capacity, i.e.  
  . (5)  (, ) (, , ) (,, ) ii iii i iii vk qk k qk ππ ⋅= + ⋅− ⋅ %%















% . (6) 
A bid function can be thought of as an “inverse demand function” that can be inverted to 
obtain each bidder i’s demand function for additional land capacity, i.e. 
1 (, ) () ii kb ρ ρ
− ⋅≡ % , 
where  ρ  indicates the price the bidder is willing to pay for additional capacity, i.e. his 
marginal willingness to pay. Note that the considered allocation rule refers to conventional 
supply and demand terms. Aggregating the demand functions of all bidders – the large and the 
small bidders, we obtain the overall demand function for additional land capacity, i.e.  






Kk k , . ρ ρ
−−
== +
⋅= ⋅+ ⋅ ∑∑ %% % ρ  (7) 
 The supply function is given by the sum of the newly available capacities, i.e.  . 
Equating the aggregated demand and supply functions, we immediately obtain the market 
clearing price 
ˆ
ll ss Ke ke k =+
c ρ  that is implicitly given by 
  ( ) ˆ ,
c K ρ . K ⋅ ≡ %  (8) 
That is, the winning bids are those that are higher than the market clearing price 
c ρ . Plugging 




ii kk ρ ) ≡ ⋅ %% . (9) 
By numerical solution, we obtain the following results: 
Proposition 1: Larger firms allocate more additional quantity than small firms. Note, the 
larger the firms are, the lower is their newly accommodated capacity.  
Proof:  In Appendix  A  we compare by means of the numerical findings the amount of 
additional land resources of the small and large firms, i.e.   and 
*
l k % *
s k , and get  . We 
further compare   for different initial capacities   and find 
% *






ll ll kk k %% k ≥  if  . 
12
ll kk <
 10 Larger firms tend to have a higher valuation for additional land resources than smaller firms 
as they benefit from higher returns to scale. That is, small firms normally have not undertaken 
the necessary investments to incur the same returns to scale. Accordingly, larger firms tend to 
bit more for additional land than small firms. Due to the efficient allocation mechanism 
applied here, they get a larger share from the newly available land resources than smaller 
firms. If the pool of newly available land is sufficiently small, as only few firms have left the 
market before, it can even be that the smaller firms do not get any additional resources, while 
the large firms share the whole pool among each other. Furthermore, our results indicate that a 
larger initial capacity reduces the valuation of additional land resources. This is due to the fact 
that the gains from increasing returns to scale are decreasing in the initial capacity.   
We turn now to the bidders’ payment for the additional land resources they get. In a Vickrey 
auction, each bidder’s payment refers to the highest losing bids of the competitors., i.e. 
without including his own bids. Each bidder’s payments equals the externality it exerts on the 
competing bidders. We denote the demand for land of all competing firms by  (, ) i K ρ − ⋅ %  with 
. Based on this, we can derive the residual supply function facing bidder i which is 
given by 
ii −≠
  { } ˆ (, ) m a x (, ) , 0 i sK K ρ − i ρ − ⋅ =− ⋅ % . (10) 
The residual supply function allows us to derive the payment  i ω  bidder i makes for the 
additional land   obtained in the auction, i.e. 
*
i k %











Note that the payment equals the externality the bidder exerts on the competing bidders.  
 
Exit. In the first stage of the game, firms decide whether to leave the market or to continue 
production. When deciding, the firms balance the profit of continuing and the earnings in the 
case of leaving the market. The optimal number of small firms leaving the agricultural sector 
is implicitly given by 
 
** (, ,, , ) (, ) sss ss s s s qk ke e k π ωω ψ + ⋅≡ ⋅ + % . (12) 
Analogously, the number of larger firms leaving the market is implicitly given by  
 
** (, ,,, ) (, ) l l ll l l ll qk ke e k π ωω ψ + ⋅≡ ⋅ + %  (13) 
 11 It turns out that that the large firms never have an incentive to leave the market. We already 
know from Proposition 1 that large firms value additional land capacities higher than small 
firms. In other words, they benefit more from continuing production with additional resources 
than from selling their own initial capacities to other firms in the market. Accordingly, we can 
state:  
Corollary 1: Small firms are more likely to exit the market. 
As large firms have a higher valuation for additional capacity than small firms, a higher 
number of initially large firms induces a higher exit rate of small firms. Accordingly, 
numerical simulations allow us to state: 
Proposition 2: The more asymmetric the initial size distribution in a market is, the higher is 
the exit rate and the higher is the share of small firms leaving the market.  
Proof: In Appendix A we numerically compare the number of firms leaving the market, i.e. 
s e , if the initial size distribution differs. We find that a higher   indicating a more 
asymmetric size distribution results in a higher number for 
m
. s e  
4 EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION 
To provide some empirical support to the fundamental rationales obtained by the theoretical 
analysis, we empirically illustrate the relationship between farm structure, exit and growth of 
farms. We use farm-level data from the agricultural census provided by the RDC
8 for West 
Germany. These contain single farm observations and allow to measure entry/exit, shrinkage 
and growth of farms measured by changes in the land endowment. The farm-individual 
observations may be representatively aggregated at the district level (321 Landkreise). Two 
periods are available, 1999-2003 and 2003-2007, implying two observations over time. In 
order to account for the regional farm size structure, we refer to the Gini coefficient
9. It 
measures the degree of asymmetries in firm size (land endowment) and indicates whether the 
used acreage is concentrated in one size category. If the land use is equally distributed among 
the size classes, the Gini coefficient is rather low and we expect a tendency to symmetric 
farms in their size. Contrarily, a high Gini coefficient indicates a concentration of the acreage 
                                                 
1 )
r j −
8 Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder. 
9 To derive the Gini coefficient we take the observations of 1999 and 2003, respectively. The Gini coefficient is 
then derived as:  , where j denotes the respective size class, r denotes the 
respective region and   denotes the cumulative share of class j on the total number of farms for region r, 
thereby indicates ‘-1’ the respective lower size class. u  denotes the cumulative share of land of class j on the 
total amount of acreage used in region r.  
1 1 1( ) (
J
rr j r j r j j Gini v v u u
− = =− + − ∑
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rj
 12 in the small or the large size category with only relatively few farms in the respective other 
category.  
Relation of Exit and the Gini. In order to explore the relation between the farm size structure 
and exit, a general linear model has been estimated using the least squares approach.
10 The 
share of shrinking and exiting farms is regressed on several explanatory variables. However, 
the main variable of interest is the Gini coefficient in 1999 and 2003, respectively, indicating 
the initial size distribution that is relevant for the farms’ respective decisions in the 
subsequent periods. We classify the regions according to three dimensions by means of a 
cluster analysis: (1) characteristic production types, (2) the socio-economic environment and 
(3)  the farm size structure.
11 The following illustration (Figure  1) relies on the regions 
clustered according to the farm structure with the aim to explore how the impact of the Gini 
coefficient differs between the cluster regions. These have been constructed using the Gini 
coefficient, the share of small, large and part-time farms as well as the average regional farm 
size. This leads to five clusters, thereby means ‘equal’ that land is rather symmetrically 
distributed over the firms and ‘unequal’ denotes that the firm size is asymmetric in that 
region. ‘large’ and ‘small’ indicate the average firm size, respectively. In Figure  1 we 
illustrate the estimated partial relationship between the rate of shrinking/exiting farms and the 
Gini coefficient in the respective cluster regions.
12 
The findings indicate a complex relation between the farm structure and the shrinking 
activities of farms. With a low Gini coefficient in 1999 (dark grey bars), the expected exit rate 
is highest in regions with many large farms (‘large equal’ and ‘very large’). With a high Gini 
coefficient in 1999 (light grey bars), the exit/shrinking activity is highest in the ‘large 
unequal’ regions, however, in the in the second period (2003-2007; bars with dots) with more 
favourable economic conditions, the exit rate is lower than in all other regions. The sensitivity 
of farms towards changing conditions seems to be highest in these regions. It should be noted, 
that only regions with a ‘large unequal’ farm size distribution and a low Gini coefficient in 
2003 (dark grey with dots) show an increase in the share of exiting/shrinking farms in the 
second period. This coincides with the theoretical findings. That is, the more large firms are in 
the market the higher the aggregate demand for additional land resources. This, in turn, causes 
                                                 
10 Summary statistics of the used explanatory variables accounting for the regional structure are given in 
Table B1 in Appendix B.  
11 Note, such clusters have also been used in Huettel and Margarian (2009); further details can also be found in 
Appendix B in Table B2. Note, in Table B3 the statistics of the variables of Table B1 differentiated by the 
cluster regions are given. 
12 Note, the estimated coefficients and their standard errors can be found in Table B4 in Appendix B, Model 1. 
 13 a higher exit rate among smaller farms. Note, that the willingness-to-pay for additional land is 
increasing under favourable conditions.  
Figure 1: Estimated partial relationship between the rate of exiting/shrinking farms and 











































Low Gini (0.47), 1999-2003 Low Gini (0.47), 2003-2007
High Gini (0.63), 1999-2003 High Gini (0.63), 2003-2007
Source: Own calculation based on RDC data 1999-2007.  
Joint Analysis of Exit, Growth and Decline. In order to illustrate the relation between exit 
and growth to find out which farms grow, we refer to the findings of Huettel and Margarian 
(2009) and reinterpret these in the light of the theoretical results. Their analysis is based on a 
Markov chain model. The respective transition probabilities are derived from the farm-
individual moves between pre-defined size classes (small, medium, large) and the additional 
exit category. These reflect the probability of a farm to move from one size class to another or 
to stay within a class in a given period. Such moves reflect farm growth, decline, exit or 
persistence in the respective size category. The transition probabilities have been aggregated 
for each region and vary over the two periods. By means of a multinomial formulation, it is 
possible to express the series of the log of a ratio of probabilities as a linear function of the 
explanatory variables (for further details see Huettel and Margarian, 2009 and Gourieroux, 
2000). 
In Figure  2, the estimated impact the Gini coefficient on the transition probabilities is 
illustrated. For each size category the probability to grow by one/two classes, to exit or to 
shrink by one/two classes for a low, medium and a high Gini coefficient (the classification of 
low, medium and high has been derived using quantiles) is shown.  






















































Source: Own calculation based on RDC data 1999-2007.
 
The smallest farms have the highest exit probability irrespective of the level of the Gini 
coefficient. Note, that the exit probability of all size categories is the higher, the higher the 
Gini coefficient is, thus the stronger the asymmetries in a region are. This coincides with the 
theoretical findings. Figure  2 further shows that medium farms grow stronger than small 
farms.
13 Theoretically, this refers to the higher valuation of initially larger firms for additional 
land resources. However, growth of the medium farms declines with a higher Gini coefficient. 
The highest shrinking probability of the medium-sized farms is observed with a high Gini 
coefficient. In the presence of dominant large farms, the medium farms’ have an higher 
incentive to shrink rather than to grow. This again relies on the higher valuation of large firms 
for additional land resources which makes it more attractive for medium farms to shrink than 
to grow. The results show also that contrary to common beliefs shrinkage is a notable 
phenomenon. It might represent a rational strategic reaction if future growth potential is 
assumed to be low. 
Growth of the Large Firms. We further explore the relation of asymmetries in firm size and 
growth of the large farms. As discussed above, the higher the availability of land is, the 
stronger the expected differentiation of farms with respect to their size. That is, starting from 
heterogeneous farms it should be the large farms that grow most under these conditions. In the 
Markov chain model growth of the large farms could not be measured. Here, we use the mean 
                                                 
13 Note that growth of the large farms cannot be measured here because when they grow they remain in that 
category. This will be further explored in the third part.  
 15 growth rates of the large farms (measured in terms of land) that remained in the large farm 
size class from 1999 until 2003 or from 2003 until 2007 for every district and regress them on 
the same explanatory variables as used to explain the exit/shrinking rates (see Table B1) using 
a general linear model. Additionally, the share of shrinking and exiting farms has been added 
as a further explanatory variable. The estimated coefficients and their standard errors are 
presented in Appendix B in Table B4 (Model 2). As expected, the growth of large farms is 
increasing in the rate of exiting and shrinking farms. However, the impact of the exit rate on 
large farms’ growth depends on the initial distribution of land between farms. This 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Estimated partial relationship between the growth of large farms, the Gini 










































Low rate of exiting/shrinking farms (0.05) Medium rate of exiting/shrinking farms (0.15)
High rate of exiting/shrinking farms (0.30)
Source: Own calculation based on RDC data 1999-2007.  
Interestingly, with a very unequal land distribution (Gini coefficient 0.63), the rate of 
exiting/shrinking farms does not severely influence the growth of large farms. In case of low 
exit rates (dotted line) we expect a higher competition on the land market as the pool of 
overall available land resources is small. This is expected to induce or to strengthen a further 
differentiation of firms with respect to their size. This is shown by the increasing growth rate 
with low exits rates in the Gini coefficient (positive slope of the dotted line). With a high rate 
of exiting farms (black line), large farms grow more in regions with an equal distribution 
(Gini 0.47) than with an unequal distribution (Gini 0.63). This is shown by the decreasing 
growth rate of large farms with high exit rates in the Gini coefficient. A low Gini coefficient 
 16 together with a higher availability of capacity (high exit rate) causes also a stronger 
differentiation in farm size.  
The results further show a significant impact of the Gini coefficient on the growth of the large 
farms in rather urban regions, in regions with a ‘large equal’ farm size structure and in regions 
that are characterised by mainly cash crop farms. In Figure 4, the predicted growth of the 
large is illustrated for regions classified according to the pre-dominating regional production 
type. It can be shown that the expected growth of the large farms in cash crop regions is 
especially low as long as the initial distribution of land is rather equal. This might indicate a 
low endogenous differentiation with respect to farm size as would have been expected in 
these regions with a pre-dominating production type that reveals a low capital intensity. 
Furthermore, in cash crop regions is the growth of the large farms especially high if the initial 
farm size distribution is very unequal. Note, an initially existing heterogeneity might be 
strengthened in the course of structural change irrespective of the capital intensity. 
Figure  4: Estimated partial relationship between regional characteristic production 
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Low Gini (0.42) Medium Gini (0.55) High Gini (0.71)
Source: Own calculation based on RDC data 1999-2007.  
Summarising, we find that regional asymmetries in firm size are positively related to exit rates 
and negatively to the growth rate of the medium farms. Shrinking is a common strategy of 
medium-sized farms in the presence of (possibly dominant) large farms. While the exit rate of 
the small farms is highest, medium farms grow stronger than small farms. Depending on the 
farm size structure, a large pool of available land resources further deepens the differentiation 
 17 of farms in their size. These findings are in line with many of the hypotheses found in the 
literature as well as with our own theoretically derived expectations. Therefore, the empirical 
results reinforce the papers’ central point that farms’ exit and growth behaviour is partly 
determined by the specific situation in the land market. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The scarcity of newly available land and the close relation of farm exits and growth induce 
the farmers’ valuation of additional land to become endogenous. A simple model has been set 
up in order to analyse possible consequences of such a market setting. Here we argue with an 
initial heterogeneity of farms. We find that in this case under the additional assumption of 
differentiated scale effects that large farms grow more than small farms. Furthermore, the 
lower the total supply of land is, the higher is the expected further differentiation of farm 
sizes. Nevertheless, large farms’ probability to exit is very low and it is the small farms, that 
increasingly leave the market in the presence of many large farms. For the empirical analysis 
we rely on data from the farm structure survey, which have been analysed in a regional 
context. The analyzed relation between the regional farm size structure and observed growth 
as well as exit rates reveals empirical support of the theoretically derived hypotheses.  
The presented analysis has to be judged as a first, preliminary approach in order to reach some 
primary understanding of possible relations between conditions on the land market and 
structural change in agriculture. There is still a need of further improvement. The formal 
analysis has to be elaborated with the aim to show the possibility of an endogenous evolution 
of heterogeneity. The theoretical modelling can also be improved by allowing for strategic 
bidding behaviour in land markets. Particularly, it can be interesting to analyse the 
commitment effect of  ex-ante investments on the bidding behaviour. Furthermore, the 
assumption of an auctioneer should be relaxed in a double auction framework. The empirical 
evidence should be based on a structural model based on micro-data about land market 
transactions. 
Beyond the methodological issue of this paper, our findings have practical implications. 
Policy-makers are interested in structural change that is compatible with social concepts and 
policy aims. If policy-makers had a better understanding of the impacts of the respective 
policy programs on structural change, it would be possible to define better and more efficient 
agricultural policy. Due to interaction on the land market the changes in policies need not 
have the same structural effects in different regions. Policies themselves as well as their 
analysis need to be adopted on a disaggregated regional level if structural development is 
 18 among their aims. In models that are used to guide and to evaluate political interventions the 
possibility of strategic interaction on the land market should be taken into account. However, 
the results do not necessarily represent a justification for policy interventions. Under the 
described complex circumstances a huge amount of detailed information would be necessary 
in order to create effective policies with certain structural goals. The necessary discrimination 
between different farmers in such an intervention might not just create practical but also 
ethical and judicial problems. 
 
 19 References  
Alvarez, L. (1999): Optimal Exit and Valuation Under Demand Uncertainty: A Real Options 
Approach. European Journal of Operational Research 114: 320-329. 
 
Alvarez, L. (1998): Exit Strategies and Price Uncertainty: A Greenian Approach. Journal of 
Mathematical Economics 29: 43–56. 
 
Bakusc, L., Fertö, I. (2007): Gibrat's Law Revisited in a Transition Economy. The Hungarian 
Case. Paper presented at the 104
th EAAE Seminar, September 5-8, 2007, Budapest, 
Hungary  
 
Balmann, A., Dautzenberg, K., Happe, K., Kellermann, K. (2006): On the Dynamics of 
Structural Change in Agriculture. Internal Frictions, Policy Threats and Vertical 
Integration. Outlook on Agriculture 35: 115-121. 
 
Balmann, A. (1997): Farm-Based Modelling of Regional Structural Change: a Cellular 
Automata Approach. European Review of Agricultural Economics 24: 85-108. 
 
Besanko, D., Doraszelski, U. (2004): Capacity Dynamics and Endogenous Asymmetries in 
Firm Size. RAND Journal of Economics 35: 23-49. 
 
Boehlje, M. (1992): Alternative Models of Structural Change in Agriculture and Related 
Industries. Agribusiness 8: 219-231. 
 
Boehlje, M. (1999). Structural Changes in the Agricultural Industries: How Do We Measure, 
Analyze and Understand them? American Journal of Agricultural Economcis 81: 1028-
1041. 
 
Breustedt, G., Glauben, T. (2007): Driving Forces behind Exiting from Farming in Western 
Europe. Journal of Agricultural Economics 58: 115-127. 
 
Chavas, J.-P. (2001): Structural Change in Agricultural Production. In: B. Gardner and G. 
Rausser (eds): Handbook of Agricultural Economics Vol. 1: 263-285. Amsterdam.  
 
Clark, J., Fulton, M., Brown, D. (1992): Gibrat's Law and Farm Growth in Canada. Canadian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 40: 55-70. 
 
Dixit, A. (1989): Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty. The Journal of Political 
Economy 97: 620-638. 
 
Doraszelski, U., Pakes, A. (2007): A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO. In: 
Armstrong, M., Porter, R. (eds): Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3. 
Elsevier, Amsterdam.  
 
Dunne, T., Roberts, M., Samuelson, L. (1988): Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries. The RAND Journal of Economics 19: 495-515. 
 
Dunne, T., Klimek, S., Roberts, M., Yi Xu, D. (2009): Entry, Exit, and the Determinants of 
Market Structure. NBER Working Papers 15313, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc. 
 
 20 Ericson, R., Pakes, A. (1989): An Alternative Theory of Firm and Industry Dynamics. 
Working Paper, Yale University. 
 
Esö, P., Nocke, V., White, L. (2007): Competition for Scarce Resources. University of 
Oxford, Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series 365. 
 
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J. (1986): A Theory of Exit in Duopoly. Econometrica 54: 943-960. 
 
Frank, M. (1988): An Intertemporal Model of Industrial Exit. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 103: 333-344. 
 
Ghemawat, P., Nalebuff, B. (1985): Exit. RAND Journal of Economics 16: 184-194. 
 
Ghemawat, P., Nalebuff, B. (1990): The Devolution of Declining Industries. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 105: 168-186. 
 
Ghemawat, P. (1990): The Snowball Effect. International Journal of Industrial Organization 
8: 335-351. 
 
Goetz, S., Debertin, D. (2001): Why Farmers Quit: a County-Level Analysis. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 83: 1010-1023. 
 
Goodard, E., Weersink, A., Chen, K. and Turvey, C. (1993). Economics of Structural Change 
in Agriculture. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 41: 475-498. 
 
Hanazono, M., Yang, H. (2009): Dynamic Entry and Exit with Uncertain Cost Positions. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 27: 474-487. 
 
Harrington, D., Reinsel, D. (1995): A Synthesis of Forces Driving Structural Change. 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 43: 3-14.  
 
Hopenhayn, H. (1992): Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium. 
Econometrica 60: 1127-1150. 
 
Huettel, S., Margarian, A. (2009): Structural Change in the West German Agricultural Sector. 
Agricultural Economics 40 S: 759-772.  
 
Isik, M., Coble, K., Hudson, D., House, L. (2003): A Model of Entry-Exit Decisions and 
Capacity Choice under Demand Uncertainty. Agricultural Economics 28: 215-224. 
 
Jovanovic, B. (1982): Selection and the Evolution of Industry. Econometrica 50: 649-670. 
 
Jovanovic, B., MacDonald, G. (1994): The Life Cycle of a Competitive Industry. Journal of 
Political Economy 102: 322-347. 
 
Kellermann, K., Sahrbacher, C., Balmann, A. (2008): Land Markets in Agent Based Models 
of Structural Change. Paper presented at the 107th EAAE Seminar “Modeling of 
Agricultural and Rural Development Policies”, Seville, Spain. 
 
Kimhi, A. and Bollmann, R. (1999): Family Farm Dynamics in Canada and Israel: The Case 
of Farm Exits. Agricultural Economics 21: 69-79. 
 21  
Klepper, S., Graddy, E. (1990): The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants of 
Market Structure. RAND Journal of Economics 21: 27-44. 
 
Klepper, S. (1996): Entry, Exit, Growth and Innovation over the Product Life Cycle. 
American Economic Review 86: 562-583. 
 
Klepper. S., Simons, K. (2000): The Making of an Oligopoly: Firm Survival and 
Technological Change in the Evolution of the U.S. Tire Industry. Journal of Political 
Economy 108: 728-760. 
 
Kostov, P., Patton, M., Moss, J., McErlean, S. (2006): Does Gibrat’s Law Hold amongst 
Dairy Farmers in Northern Ireland? MPRA Paper 3370, University Library of Munich, 
Germany. 
 
Krishna, K. (1999): Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: the Snowball Effect Revisited. 
Economic Theory 13: 377-391. 
 
Leathers, H. (1992): The Market for Land and the Impact of Farm Programs on Farm 
Numbers. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74: 291-298.  
 
Lieberman, M. (1990): Exit from Declining Industries: 'Shakeout' or 'Stakeout'?. RAND 
Journal of Economics 21: 538-554. 
 
Londregan, J. (1990): Entry and Exit Over the Industry Life Cycle. The RAND Journal of 
Economics 21: 446-458. 
 
Maggi, G. (1996): Endogenous Leadership in a New Market. RAND Journal of Economics 
27: 641-659. 
 
Margarian, A. (2007): Mehr-Ebenen-Modelle in der Analyse agrarstruktureller 
Entwicklungen - Methodik und Implikationen. Agrarwirtschaft 56: 340-353. 
 
Murto, P. (2004): Exit in Duopoly under Uncertainty. RAND Journal of Economics 35: 111-
127. 
 
Pietola, K., Vaere, M. and Oude Lansink, A. (2003): Timing and Type of Exit from Farming: 
Farmer's Early Retirement Programmes in Finland. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics 30: 99-116. 
 
Reynolds, S. (1988): Plant Closings and Exit Behaviour in Declining Industries. 
Econometrica 55: 493-503. 
 
Reynolds, S. and Wilson, B. (2000): Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, 
and Asymmetric Outcomes. Journal of Economic Theory 92: 122-141.  
 
Saloner, G. (1987): Cournot Duopoly with Two Production Periods. Journal of Economic 
Theory 42: 183-187. 
 
 22 Schmitt, G. (1992): Verfügen die Agrarökonomen über eine Theorie agrarstrukturellen 
Wandels? Einige jüngere Untersuchungen zu diesem Thema. Berichte über 
Landwirtschaft 70: 213-230. 
 
Shapiro, D., Bollman, R.D. and Ehrensaft, P. (1987): Farm Size and Growth in Canada. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69: 477-483. 
 
Sutton, J. (2007): Market Structure: The Bounds Approach. In: Armstrong, M., Porter, R. 
(eds): Handbook of Industrial Organisation. Volume 3. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
 
Sutton, J. (1991): Sunk Cost and Market Structure. The MIT Press. Cambridge, USA.  
 
Tirole, J. (1988): The Theory of Industrial Organisation. The MIT Press. Cambridge, 
USA. 
 
Tonini, A. and Jongeneel, R. (2007): The Distribution of Dairy Farm size in Poland: A 
Markov Approach Based on Information Theory. Applied Economics 1: 1-15. 
 
Vranken, L., Swinnen, F. (2006): Theory and Evidence from Hungary. World Development 
34: 481-500. 
 
Whinston, M. (1988): Exit with Multiplant Firms. The RAND Journal of Economics 19: 568-
588. 
 
Weiss, C. (1999): Farm Growth and Survival: Econometric Evidence for Individual Farms in 
Upper Austria. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81: 103-116. 
 
Zepeda, L. (1995): Technical Change and the Structure of Production: A Non-Stationary 
Markov Analysis. European Review of Agricultural Economics 22: 41-60. 
 
 23 APPENDIX A NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR THE PROOFS 
Table A: Numerical results  
N = 20;  
αs = 1/4 










of large farms 
Add. capacity 
of small farms 
0.25 s k =  
0.5 l k =   s e   () ,, ii i i qk k π +⋅ %  
s k ω ψ +  
c ρ  
*
l k %  
*
s k %  
m=6  3.0  0  0.1420 0.5391 0.1250  0 
  3.5  0  0.1365 0.5202 0.1458  0 
  4.0  0.0673 0.1307 0.5000 0.1667  0 
  4.5  0.1018 0.1245 0.4785 0.1875  0 
 5.0  0.1234  0.1227 0.4561 0.2080 0.0002 
  5.5  0.1235 0.1211 0.4500 0.2134 0.0111 
  6.0  0.1236 0.1193 0.4429 0.2196 0.0228 
  6.5  0.1239 0.1171 0.4348 0.2265 0.0355 
  7.0  0.1243 0.1146 0.4256 0.2343 0.0492 
  7.5  0.1250 0.1117 0.4148 0.2431 0.0641 
  8.0  0.1260 0.1083 0.4024 0.2530 0.0803 
        
m=7  3.0  0  0.1467 0.5542 0.1071  0 
  3.5  0  0.1424 0.5391 0.1250  0 
  4.0  0  0.1379 0.5230 0.1429  0 
  4.5  0.0451 0.1331 0.5059 0.1607  0 
  5.0  0.0896 0.1280 0.4879 0.1786  0 
  5.5  0.1120 0.1226 0.4689 0.1964  0 
 6.0  0.1234  0.1220 0.4539 0.2100 0.0043 
  6.5  0.1235 0.1200 0.4465 0.2164 0.0169 
  7.0  0.1238 0.1177 0.4380 0.2238 0.0306 
  7.5  0.1242 0.1150 0.4281 0.2321 0.0455 
  8.0  0.1249 0.1118 0.4166 0.2416 0.0617 
        
m=8  3.0  0  0.1499 0.5649 0.0938  0 
  3.5  0  0.1464 0.5524 0.1094  0 
  4.0  0  0.1428 0.5391 0.1250  0 
  4.5  0  0.1389 0.5250 0.1406  0 
  5.0  0  0.1348 0.5103 0.1563  0 
  5.5  0.0784 0.1305 0.4948 0.1719  0 
  6.0  0.1018 0.1260 0.4785 0.1875  0 
  6.5  0.1189 0.1213 0.4615 0.2031  0 
 7.0  0.1235  0.1209 0.4508 0.2127 0.0097 
  7.5  0.1236 0.1184 0.4418 0.2205 0.0246 
  8.0  0.1240 0.1155 0.4312 0.2295 0.0409 
 24 Table A: Numerical results (continued) 
N = 20;  
αs = 1/4 










of large farms 
Add. capacity 
of small farms 
0.25 s k =  
0.5 l k =   s e   () ,, ii i i qk k π +⋅ %  
s k ω ψ +  
c ρ  
*
l k %  
*
s k %  
        
m=9  3.0  0 0.1522  0.5729  0.0833 0 
  3.5  0 0.1493  0.5622  0.0972 0 
  4.0  0 0.1463  0.5509  0.1111 0 
  4.5  0 0.1430  0.5391  0.1250 0 
  5.0  0 0.1396  0.5266  0.1389 0 
  5.5  0 0.1361  0.5136  0.1528 0 
  6.0  0.0673 0.1323 0.5000 0.1667  0 
  6.5  0.0925 0.1285 0.4858 0.1806  0 
  7.0  0.1099 0.1244 0.4711 0.1944  0 
 7.5  0.1234  0.1220 0.4560 0.2081 0.0005 
  8.0  0.1235 0.1193 0.4464 0.2165 0.0171 
        
N=20;  
αs = 1/4 










of large farms 
Add. capacity 
of small farms 
0.25 s k =
0.4 l k =   s e   () ,, ii i i qk k π +⋅ %  
s k ω ψ +  
c ρ  
*
l k %  
*
s k %  
m=6  3.0  0  0.1610 0.6116 0.1250 0.2525 
  3.5  0  0.1573 0.5989 0.1458 0.2546 
  4.0  0  0.1532 0.5850 0.1667 0.2574 
  4.5  0  0.1487 0.5698 0.1875 0.2609 
  5.0  0  0.1438 0.5532 0.2083 0.2651 
  5.5  0  0.1385 0.5354 0.2292 0.2702 
  6.0  0  0.1328 0.5163 0.2500 0.2761 
  6.5  0.0921 0.1267 0.4958 0.2708 0.2830 
  7.0  0.1198 0.1203 0.4741 0.2917 0.2910 
 7.5  0.1250  0.1236 0.4635 0.3014 0.0103 
  8.0  0.1252 0.1213 0.4555 0.3086 0.0248 
 
 
 25 APPENDIX B: DETAILED DATA INFORMATION AND RESULTS 
Table B1: Summary statistics the explanatory variables used to explain farm exits 
Variable
Gini coefficient 
Centered Gini coefficient 
Share of exiting farms 
Share of shrinking farms
Share of exiting/shrinking farms
Centered share of exiting/shrinking farms
Growth of permanently large farms

































Table B2: Summary Statistics of the structural cluster regions 
Cluster N Average farm  Gini coefficient Share of farms  Share of farms  Share of part
size <30 ha >100 ha  time farms
Small - equal 79 22.64 0.46 0.74 0.01 0.5
(3.25) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.09)
Small - unequal 134 20.12 0.59 0.8 0.03 0.59
(6.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.15)
Large - equal  49 31.85 0.51 0.59 0.04 0.36
(4.21) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.10)
Large - unequal 26 36.03 0.58 0.62 0.09 0.58
(4.22) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Very large 39 53.23 0.54 0.45 0.15 0.36
(10.24) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09)
All regions 327 27.7 0.54 0.7 0.05 0.51
(12.24) (0.08) (0.14) (0.05) (0.15)
Note: Standard deviation in brackets.
Source: Own calculations based on RDC 1999-2007.  
 
 26 Table B3 Summary statistics of the main explanatory variables differentiated by the cluster 
regions 
Variable Cluster Mean Standard Min  Max
Region Deviation
large equal 9.51 6.37 -3.33 43.93
large unequal 9.10 2.87 3.12 16.53
small equal 9.61 4.57 -11.81 29.48
small unequal 9.18 6.85 -30.93 47.25
very large 7.77 2.70 2.01 16.47
large equal 0.18 0.04 0.08 0.25
large unequal 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.30
small equal 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.20
small unequal 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.28
very large 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.30
large equal 0.52 0.05 0.39 0.71
large unequal 0.59 0.03 0.51 0.67
small equal 0.47 0.05 0.31 0.60
small unequal 0.60 0.06 0.38 0.75
very large 0.53 0.06 0.42 0.66
large equal 0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.09
large unequal 0.03 0.04 -0.09 0.13
small equal -0.02 0.02 -0.09 0.03
small unequal 0.00 0.04 -0.12 0.11
very large 0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.13
large equal -0.03 0.05 -0.15 0.16
large unequal 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.12
small equal -0.07 0.05 -0.23 0.05
small unequal 0.05 0.06 -0.17 0.21
very large -0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.11















 27 Table B4: Estimated coefficients for the models explaining the rate of exiting/shrinking farms 
and the growth of the large farms 
     Model 1      Model 2
Variables  Interaction of  Cluster       Share of exiting/      Growth of 
the variable with… Characteristic      shrinking farms      the large farms
Intercept 0.184 6.95
(0.007) *** (1.21) ***
Centered 0.054 -5.08
Gini coefficient  (0.085) (19.30)
Year -0.018 2.63
(0.003) *** (0.44) ***
Centered Year -0.02 --
Gini coefficient  (0.118)
Centered share of  -- 32.49
exiting/shrinking farms (6.68) ***
Centered share of  Centered  -- -310.43
exiting/shrinking farms Gini coefficient  (76.60) ***
large equal 0.006 2.96
(0.006) (0.91) **
large unequal 0.009 0.58
(0.008) (1.34)
small equal -0.019 2.56
(0.006) ** (1.04) **
small unequal -0.012 2.19
(0.005) ** (0.81) **
very large 0.000 0.00
Centered large equal 0.120 40.09
Gini coefficient  (0.120) (14.65) **
large unequal 0.560 8.46
(0.189) ** (24.33)
small equal 0.199 -3.92
(0.099) * (14.52)
small unequal 0.298 -5.96
(0.096) ** (12.24)
very large 0.000 0.00
Centered large equal 0.059 --
Gini coefficient  (0.162)
& Year large unequal -0.771 --
(0.215) ***
small equal -0.080 --
(0.132)
small unequal -0.131 --
(0.133)
very large 0.000 --
Regional clusters with 
respect to the farm size 
structure
Regional cluster 
indicator with respect 
to the farm size 
structure
Regional cluster 
indicator with respect 
to the farm size 
structure
 
 28 Table B4: Estimated coefficients for the models explaining the rate of exiting/shrinking farms 
and the growth of the large farms (continued) 
     Model 1      Model 2
Variables  Interaction of  Cluster       Share of exiting/      Growth of 
the variable with… Characteristic      shrinking farms      the large farms
Rural regions with -0.001 -1.51
negative economy (0.005) (0.85) °
Rural regions with -0.005 -1.65
positive economy (0.004) (0.71) *
Purely rural 0.008 -1.06
regions (0.005) ° (0.77)
Urban regions with -0.020 -3.53
negative economy (0.005) *** (0.90) ***
Urban regions with 0.000 0.00
positive economy (0.00)
Centered negative rural -- 12.66
Gini coefficient  (10.62)
positive rural -- 5.65
(8.70)
purely rural -- 8.46
(9.36)
negative urban -- -26.59
(11.02) **








Cash Crop -0.001 1.75
(0.006) (1.02) °
Mixed 0.009 1.78
(0.005) ° (0.85) *
Pig & Poultry 0.000 0.00
Centered Grassland --
Gini coefficient  -9.24
Horticulture -- (14.38)
19.94
Intensive Pig&Poultry -- (18.60)
-8.47
Cash Crop -- (32.60)
39.12
Mixed -- (17.17) *
-4.55
Pig & Poultry -- (15.68)
0.00
R-square 0.34 0.24
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. °, *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1%, resepctively. 
Source: Own calculation based on RDC data 1999-2007 using SAS 9.2 Proc GLM.
Regional cluster 
indicator with respect 
to the characteristic 
production type
Regional cluster 
indicator with respect 
to the general 
economic situation
Regional cluster 
indicator with respect 
to the general 
economic situation
Regional cluster 
indicator with respect 
to the characteristic 
production type
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